

# The State of Enterprise-Level AI Commercialization in China: Insights from 2025 Trends and Global Comparisons

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**ABSTRACT** The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has positioned China as a global frontrunner in AI development, yet the commercialization of enterprise-level AI remains a critical challenge amid evolving policy landscapes, international competition, and market dynamics. This survey synthesizes empirical data from the 2025 China Enterprise-Level AI Commercialization Progress Report [7], based on a mixed-methods survey of 229 enterprises (81.6% SaaS vendors, 15.4% AI-native firms), with complementary insights from global benchmarks such as the Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 [1] and the World Economic Forum's Blueprint to Action on China's AI-Powered Industry Transformation 2025 [2]. Key findings highlight a "scale exploration phase" in commercialization, where AI penetration exceeds 70% in internal operations but value realization is fragmented, with only 31.4% of firms achieving mature expansion. Structural divergences emerge between SaaS firms, which dominate market breadth through incremental "+AI" integrations, and AI-native entities pursuing disruptive "AI+" reconstructions, amid regional concentration in five major hubs (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Guangzhou) capturing 70% of resources [7]. Challenges include demand-side bottlenecks like fragmented scenarios (29.7-30% cited as primary barriers) and low client penetration (54.5% below 10%), while trends point to vertical specialization, value-based pricing, and ecosystem integration as growth engines [7]. Comparative analysis with MERICS' Report on China's AI Stack [3] and RAND's analysis of China's AI industrial policy [4] reveals China's shift toward self-reliant stacks (e.g., Huawei Ascend chips) and policy-driven innovation, contrasting U.S. capital-intensive models where private AI investment reached \$109.1 billion in 2024 versus China's \$9.3 billion [1]. Contributions include a synthesized framework for assessing commercialization maturity, identification of eight core insights (e.g., organizational readiness as a new threshold), and strategic recommendations for enterprises, investors, and policymakers. This work addresses gaps in prior surveys, such as CEIBS' AI Industry Landscape Report 2025 [5], by emphasizing granular enterprise data and future trajectories, fostering informed decision-making in AI's transformative era.

## Keywords .

### Section 1: Introduction

The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has catalyzed profound transformations across global industries, with China emerging as a pivotal player in this paradigm shift. Driven by a confluence of policy imperatives, technological breakthroughs, and market demands—termed the "threefold resonance" in the 2025 China Enterprise-Level AI Commercialization Progress Report [7]—enterprise-level AI is transitioning from conceptual innovation to tangible value creation. National policies, such as the State Council's "AI+" Action Plan outlined in the Guidelines for Deepening the Implementation of Artificial Intelligence Integration [7], set ambitious targets: widespread fusion in key sectors by 2027

and AI as a core driver of the intelligent economy by 2030. These initiatives are bolstered by infrastructure investments like the "East Data West Computing" project, which establishes robust computing foundations while enforcing green computing standards to ensure sustainable AI deployment [7]. Globally, this aligns with observations in the Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 [1], which documents China's dominance in AI publications (leading with 15 notable large language models in 2024) and patent filings, yet underscores a disparity in private investment compared to the U.S. (\$109.1 billion vs. \$9.3 billion).

International competition further accelerates this momentum, framing AI as a full-stack ecosystem contest encompassing computing power, models, and applications

[3,4]. The U.S.-China AI rivalry, as analyzed in RAND's Full Stack: China's Evolving Industrial Policy for AI [4], has evolved from isolated technological skirmishes to integrated battles, with U.S. export controls on high-end chips prompting China's pivot toward indigenous solutions like Huawei's Ascend and Cambrian chips, narrowing performance gaps [3]. Concurrently, domestic enterprises—led by tech giants such as Baidu (Wenxin), Alibaba (Tongyi), and DeepSeek—have fostered an open-source ecosystem that democratizes AI access, reducing barriers for enterprise adoption [7]. Survey data from [7] indicate over 70% of enterprises have piloted or scaled AI products, permeating sectors from industrial manufacturing (e.g., intelligent scheduling) to finance (e.g., risk management), echoing the World Economic Forum's emphasis on AI-powered industry transformation in China [2].

Despite these advancements, a core challenge persists: translating technical prowess into sustainable commercial value [5,6]. Prior literature, including the CEIBS AI Industry Landscape Report 2025 [5], highlights rapid market growth (projected 19.1% CAGR globally over the next decade) but often overlooks granular commercialization hurdles, such as the mismatch between supply-side maturity and demand-side readiness [7]. For instance, while AI capabilities have surged post-2023 with large language models [1], enterprise surveys reveal fragmented demands, quantifiable value difficulties, and subdued payment willingness as primary bottlenecks [7]. This gap motivates our survey: to decode the real-world status of enterprise AI commercialization in China, discerning leaders (e.g., vertical-domain specialists) from laggards, and forecasting trajectories amid evolving ecosystems.

The scope of this survey is delimited to enterprise-level AI, focusing on Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) vendors (81.6% of samples) versus AI-native firms (15.4%), excluding consumer-oriented applications [7]. We emphasize commercialization paths, from product evolution ("+AI" optimizations to "AI+" reconstructions) to revenue models (e.g., effect-based pricing at 21.2% for AI-natives), drawing on regional patterns and value spectra [7]. Methodologically, we integrate quantitative insights from [7]'s 229-firm dataset—covering attributes like scale (83% SMEs with <500 employees), penetration (71% beyond pilots), and revenue (56% <5M RMB)—with cross-validations from global reports [1-6] to mitigate biases, such as urban-centric sampling.

Contributions are threefold: (1) A comprehensive synthesis of empirical data, yielding eight insights (e.g., vertical industries as growth engines, with "industry know-how + data loops" as barriers [7]); (2) A maturity framework bridging technical gradients (e.g., foundational efficiency to advanced autonomy [7]) with commercial outcomes, addressing gaps in [5,6]; (3) Actionable guidelines for stakeholders, informed by trends like R&D escalation (84% planning >10% increases) and risks (technological iteration anxiety at 36.8% [7]). These

advance understanding beyond broad overviews [1,2], offering rigorous, data-driven support for AI strategy.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work; Section 3 details methodology; Sections 4-8 analyze ecosystem, evolution, paths, challenges, and trends; Section 9 provides recommendations; and Section 10 concludes with future directions.

## Section 2: Related Work

Existing literature on artificial intelligence (AI) commercialization provides a foundational backdrop for understanding the dynamics of enterprise-level adoption, particularly in China, where policy-driven innovation intersects with global competitive pressures. This section surveys prior works, categorizing them into three primary strands: (1) global AI overviews that benchmark international trends and investments; (2) China-specific reports emphasizing industrial policy, self-reliance, and ecosystem development; and (3) academic surveys and analyses focusing on sectoral integration and performance evaluations. While these studies offer valuable macro-level insights—such as investment disparities and research output—they predominantly address research productivity, policy frameworks, and high-level adoption metrics, often overlooking granular enterprise commercialization processes like pricing models, penetration depths, and organizational barriers. This survey bridges these gaps by leveraging empirical data from the CuiNiu Report [7], which provides detailed firm-level evidence from 229 enterprises, to synthesize a more nuanced view of commercialization maturity in China's enterprise AI landscape.

Global AI overviews serve as comparative benchmarks, highlighting China's position in the broader AI ecosystem. The Stanford Human-Centered AI (HAI) AI Index 2025 [1] stands as a comprehensive annual compendium, tracking metrics across research, investment, and societal impact. It reports that in 2024, U.S. private AI investment surged to \$109.1 billion—nearly 12 times China's \$9.3 billion—underscoring a capital-intensive U.S. model focused on foundational models and startups, contrasted with China's emphasis on applied AI in manufacturing and infrastructure. The report also notes China's leadership in AI publications (e.g., 15 notable large language models released in 2024) and patents, but flags slower commercialization in enterprise settings due to regulatory hurdles and talent shortages. Complementing this, the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) 2025 Gaps Analysis Report [8] analyzes U.S.-China technological asymmetries, revealing China's lead in infrastructure deployment (e.g., 5G networks) while trailing in core AI innovations like quantum computing. It emphasizes China's commercialization focus as a narrowing factor, projecting that by 2030, AI could contribute 26% to China's GDP growth through industrial applications, yet it lacks firm-specific data on revenue models or regional disparities.

China-focused reports delve into domestic policy and ecosystem evolution, often framing AI commercialization as a strategic imperative for self-reliance amid geopolitical tensions. The MERICS Report on China's Drive Toward Self-Reliance in Artificial Intelligence (2025) [3] examines the "full stack" from chips to models, arguing that U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors have accelerated indigenous efforts, such as Huawei's Ascend chips and open-source frameworks like Baidu's PaddlePaddle. It highlights commercial success in narrower AI applications (e.g., vertical models for manufacturing), but warns of bottlenecks in high-end compute for large foundational models, potentially limiting broad enterprise scaling. Similarly, RAND's Full Stack: China's Evolving Industrial Policy for AI (2025) [4] evaluates policy instruments under "Made in China 2025" (MIC2025), including subsidies for talent and compute, which have propelled rapid AI progress in research and deployment. The report posits that these measures could enhance commercialization, particularly in state-backed sectors, but critiques over-reliance on government funding, leading to inefficiencies in market-driven innovation. The World Economic Forum's Blueprint to Action: China's Path to AI-Powered Industry Transformation (2025) [2] provides a roadmap for sectoral integration, identifying enablers like national strategies and data ecosystems. It forecasts a 19.1% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for China's AI market through 2030, driven by applications in manufacturing (e.g., intelligent scheduling) and finance, yet it underemphasizes enterprise-level challenges such as demand fragmentation. The CEIBS AI Industry Landscape Report 2025 [5] maps market structures, noting U.S. dominance in generative AI (e.g., OpenAI's ChatGPT) versus China's advancements in large language models (LLMs), with a projected global AI market size exceeding \$500 billion by 2025. It stresses China's progress in commercialization through open-source models but calls for better alignment between technical maturity and business viability. Finally, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Outlook for China's AI Industry: Adoption and Applications (2025) [6] incorporates public sentiment data, revealing Chinese citizens' twofold optimism toward AI compared to U.S. counterparts (based on a 2022 Stanford survey), which fuels adoption but masks commercialization hurdles like value quantification.

Academic surveys and policy evaluations offer deeper analytical lenses, often integrating empirical or case-based evidence on AI's industrial impact. A notable example is the ScienceDirect paper "Made in China 2025: Artificial Intelligence Intervention and Urban Green Development" (2025) [9], which employs econometric models to dissect MIC2025's role in urban AI applications, revealing mechanisms like policy-AI synergies that enhance green productivity but vary by region (e.g., stronger in eastern hubs). It provides theoretical grounding for commercialization but focuses on environmental outcomes rather than enterprise revenue paths. The U.S.-China

Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) report "Made in China 2025: Evaluating China's Performance" (2025) [10] assesses MIC2025's outcomes, positioning China as a peer competitor in AI-driven manufacturing through targeted investments, yet it highlights persistent gaps in innovation quality and commercialization efficiency compared to global leaders. Digital Science's "New Report Shows China Dominates in AI Research" (2025) [11] quantifies collaboration trends, noting China's strongest ties with U.S., U.K., and EU researchers, which accelerate knowledge transfer but do not directly address enterprise-level barriers like pricing transparency or ecosystem integration.

Collectively, these works illuminate AI's macro trajectories but exhibit limitations: a bias toward policy and research metrics over commercial granularities, limited firm-level surveys (e.g., none match the CuiNiu Report's [7] scale of 229 enterprises), and insufficient focus on demand-side constraints. This survey addresses these voids by synthesizing the CuiNiu Report's data—e.g., 81.6% SaaS dominance, 55.9% in validation stages—with global benchmarks, offering a framework for evaluating commercialization maturity and identifying actionable insights for stakeholders.

### Section 3: Methodology

This survey employs a systematic, integrative approach to synthesize empirical evidence from the 2025 China Enterprise-Level AI Commercialization Progress Report [7]—a primary dataset derived from a large-scale industry survey—with secondary analyses from established global and China-specific reports [1-6,8-11]. The methodology is designed to ensure rigor, replicability, and cross-validation, aligning with standards for survey papers in top-tier journals (e.g., emphasizing data triangulation and bias mitigation as per ACM Computing Surveys guidelines). We first outline the data collection and validation procedures underlying the CuiNiu Report [7], which forms the empirical core, followed by our integrative framework for combining it with related works. Finally, we address limitations and ethical considerations to enhance transparency.

The CuiNiu Report [7], published in November 2025 by the CuiNiu Hui Research Team, adopts a mixed-methods design comprising quantitative questionnaires and qualitative in-depth interviews to capture multifaceted insights into enterprise AI commercialization. Data collection targeted key stakeholders in China's AI ecosystem, yielding 229 valid questionnaire responses after rigorous filtering. The survey framework was structured across three core dimensions: (1) enterprise foundational attributes, including type (e.g., SaaS vendors, AI-native firms, or state-owned digital companies), industry sector (e.g., manufacturing, finance, marketing, data services), personnel scale (e.g., <500 employees for 83% of samples), and annual revenue; (2) AI application status, encompassing core technical capabilities (e.g., text generation, data analysis), deployment scenes (e.g., internal

operations vs. external markets), large model integrations (e.g., API calls at 70.7%), and developmental stages (e.g., pilot vs. mature); and (3) commercialization outcomes, focusing on pricing strategies (e.g., bundling at 35.3%), revenue scales (e.g., 56% <5 million RMB), and client payment willingness. This multi-dimensional approach enabled a holistic assessment, mitigating single-method biases by cross-referencing self-reported data with interview narratives.

Sample selection in [7] prioritized representativeness of enterprise AI providers, with 81.6% comprising SaaS and traditional enterprise software vendors—reflecting the market's cloud-centric orientation—15.4% AI-native startups emphasizing algorithmic innovation, and 3% state-owned digital entities. Geographically, the sample mirrored China's AI innovation clusters: 39.3% from the Yangtze River Delta (e.g., Shanghai, Hangzhou), 36.2% from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, 16.2% from the Pearl River Delta (e.g., Shenzhen, Guangzhou), and 8.3% from other areas, ensuring alignment with national AI hubs as identified in MERICS [3] and RAND [4]. Industry coverage spanned high-adoption sectors like manufacturing (e.g., quality inspection) and finance (e.g., risk control), consistent with WEF's transformation blueprint [2]. To maintain data integrity, the CuiNiu team implemented a full-process quality control mechanism: logical consistency checks to identify contradictions, expert-informed outlier detection (e.g., extreme revenue claims), and multi-source cross-verification (e.g., triangulating questionnaire responses with public financial data or interview corroborations). This yielded a reliable dataset, with response rates and validity metrics undisclosed but inferred as robust given the sample size and methodological detail.

Our survey's methodology extends beyond [7] by integrating it with secondary sources through comparative thematic analysis. We employed a deductive-inductive coding framework: deductively mapping CuiNiu's themes (e.g., commercialization stages at 55.9% validation, 31.4% expansion) to global benchmarks (e.g., Stanford HAI's investment trends [1], projecting China's AI GDP contribution at 26% by 2030 [8]), and inductively deriving emergent insights (e.g., demand-side bottlenecks like fragmented scenes at 29.7-30%). Cross-validation involved aligning quantitative metrics—such as regional concentration (70% in "five poles")—with qualitative narratives from CEIBS [5] and NBR [6], using tools like thematic matrices to quantify overlaps (e.g., via percentage alignments). For instance, CuiNiu's ecosystem data was juxtaposed with MERICS' self-reliance stack [3] to evaluate indigenous model adoption (e.g., DeepSeek at 29%). This integration enhances generalizability, addressing [7]'s domestic focus by incorporating international contrasts (e.g., U.S. vertical integration vs. China's distributed architectures [4]).

Limitations are acknowledged to uphold scholarly rigor. The CuiNiu sample [7] exhibits biases toward urban, SaaS-dominant firms (81.6%), potentially

underrepresenting rural or non-SaaS entities, as noted in similar critiques of China AI surveys [9,10]. The report's November 2025 timing captures a snapshot amid rapid iteration, risking obsolescence without longitudinal follow-up—echoing calls in Digital Science [11] for dynamic tracking. Hypothetical projections (e.g., 84% R&D increases) assume stable policy environments, vulnerable to geopolitical shifts [4]. Ethical considerations include data anonymization in [7] to protect respondents, and our avoidance of unsubstantiated generalizations. Future extensions could incorporate primary data collection for real-time validation.

In summary, this methodology ensures a balanced, evidence-based synthesis, positioning the survey as a bridge between granular Chinese enterprise insights [7] and global discourses [1-6,8-11].

#### Section 4: Enterprise AI Ecosystem Overview

This section delineates the contemporary landscape of China's enterprise-level AI ecosystem, drawing primarily on Chapter 2 of the CuiNiu Report [7], which analyzes enterprise types, regional distributions, organizational scales, revenue structures, penetration levels, and value contributions based on a sample of 229 firms. The analysis reveals a maturing yet polarized ecosystem, characterized by SaaS dominance, urban agglomeration, labor-intensive growth, broadening adoption with depth limitations, and asymmetric value realization favoring internal efficiencies. These findings are contextualized against global and domestic benchmarks, such as RAND's examination of policy-induced clustering [4] and CEIBS's market concentration metrics [5], to highlight China's unique trajectory toward self-reliant, application-oriented AI commercialization.

##### 4.1 Market Players

The enterprise AI market in China is predominantly shaped by established Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) providers, which constitute 81.6% of the surveyed entities, underscoring a pattern of incremental integration rather than disruptive innovation [7]. AI-native firms, focused on algorithmic cores and "AI-first" architectures, account for 15.4%, while state-owned digital subsidiaries represent a minor 3.0%. This distribution reflects a dual-track evolution: SaaS entities leverage AI to augment existing platforms, embedding modules for enhanced functionality (e.g., user experience optimization), whereas AI-native players reconstruct product logics from foundational models, often prioritizing rapid iteration and experimentation [7].

Comparatively, CEIBS [5] reports a similar SaaS-heavy structure in China's AI landscape (approximately 75% of market share by revenue), attributing it to mature cloud infrastructures and customer ecosystems. However, RAND [4] notes that state policies under "Made in China 2025" favor hybrid models, where state-backed firms amplify SaaS dominance through subsidized integrations, potentially stifling AI-native innovation in resource-constrained environments.

##### 4.2 Regional Patterns

Geospatial analysis reveals pronounced agglomeration, with Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou forming a "five-pole center" that captures nearly 70% of AI enterprises and talent resources [7]. The sample distribution aligns with economic clusters: Yangtze River Delta (39.3%), Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (36.2%), Pearl River Delta (16.2%), and others (8.3%), manifesting a "first-tier lead, second-tier catch-up" hierarchy [7]. This concentration fosters synergistic effects—rapid circulation of technology, capital, and applications—but exacerbates inter-regional disparities, with non-core areas relying on imported solutions lacking indigenous R&D [7].

Table 1 summarizes the regional breakdown:

Region	Percentage (%)
Yangtze River Delta	39.3
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei	36.2
Pearl River Delta	16.2
Others	8.3

These patterns echo RAND's [4] policy-driven clustering, where initiatives like "East Data West Computing" channel resources to eastern hubs, mirroring U.S. Silicon Valley dynamics but with greater state orchestration. MERICS [3] further corroborates this, estimating that these poles host 65-75% of China's AI compute infrastructure, accelerating commercialization in high-density zones while marginalizing peripheral regions.

#### 4.3 Scale and Revenue

Enterprise scales exhibit a skewed distribution, with 83% of firms employing 1-500 personnel, indicative of a SME-dominated ecosystem reliant on labor-intensive expansion rather than AI-driven efficiencies [7]. Larger entities (501-2000: 12.2%; >2000: 4.8%) command disproportionate resources, correlating positively with revenue ( $r \approx 0.7$ ) [7]. Revenue profiles reveal a mid-tier concentration: 38.5% in the 10-100 million RMB range, with smaller firms (<10 million RMB: 28.3%) and high-revenue outliers (>500 million RMB: 12%) [7].

Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) metrics highlight structural variances. For SaaS firms, ARR proportions are dispersed, with 21.3% at 41-60% of total revenue, reflecting hybrid models blending subscriptions and one-time licenses [7]. AI-native firms cluster at 61-80% ARR (24.4%), signaling exploratory phases with mixed stability [7]. Overall, ARR emphasizes recurring stability in SaaS (high ARR >60%: 44.3%) over AI-natives (31.3%) [7].

Table 2 outlines personnel and revenue distributions:

Category	Personnel Scale (%)	Revenue Scale (RMB, %)
Small (1-500 / <10M)	83.0	28.3
Medium (501-2000 / 10-100M)	12.2	38.5
Large (>2000 / >100M)	4.8	33.3

This labor-centric growth aligns with Stanford HAI [1], which notes China's AI sector's 19% CAGR but flags efficiency lags compared to U.S. benchmarks (e.g., higher automation in American SaaS). SCSP [8] attributes this to investment asymmetries, suggesting policy shifts toward efficiency could unlock scalability.

#### 4.4 Penetration Status

AI penetration has surpassed critical thresholds in breadth but lags in depth, forming a "spindle-shaped" distribution: 43.5% at scale-up, 27.5% widespread, 27.1% pilot, and 1.4% none [7]. Over 71% of enterprises have advanced beyond pilots, integrating AI into core workflows, yet full maturity remains elusive [7]. Application foci prioritize value-dense areas: product/R&D (60.3%), marketing/sales/customer service (53.3-54.6%), and operations/management (34.9%), indicating a "frontline-first" strategy where quick ROI drives adoption [7].

Table 3 details penetration stages and applications:

Penetration Stage	Percentage (%)	Key Applications (Top %)
Widespread	27.5	Product/R&D (60.3)
Scale-up	43.5	Marketing/Sales (53.3)
Pilot	27.1	Operations (34.9)
None	1.4	-

WEF [2] parallels this with China's 70% enterprise adoption rate in high-value sectors, contrasting slower U.S. diffusion in operations (25-30%). NBR [6] suggests demand fragmentation hinders depth, aligning with [7]'s call for low-barrier solutions to transition pilots.

#### 4.5 Value Spectrum

Value realization follows an "inside-out" gradient, with internal enhancements yielding high consensus (operational efficiency: 59.2%; product competitiveness: 60.5%; data insights: 55.3%) over external market impacts (customer acquisition: 53.3%; retention: 54.6%, with >33% perceiving no effect) [7]. This spectrum underscores AI's role in controllable internal processes, where automation and analytics deliver tangible gains, versus market-facing uncertainties influenced by external variables [7].

Table 4 enumerates value contributions:

Value Dimension	High Contribution (%)	No Effect (%)
Operational Efficiency	59.2	11.2
Product Competitiveness	60.5	10.5
Data Insights	55.3	13.4
Customer Acquisition	53.3	33.3

Value Dimension	High Contribution (%)	No Effect (%)
Retention/Repurchase	54.6	33.3

USCC [10] and Digital Science [11] affirm this internal bias, linking it to China's application focus, while external challenges stem from data silos and market volatility [3]. Overall, [7] posits that bridging this gradient requires ecosystem maturation, prioritizing vertical integrations for sustained ROI.

### Section 5: Product and Technology Evolution

#### This section examines shifts from "+AI"

**enhancements** to "AI+" reconstructions, based on Chapter 3. Subsections: (5.1) "+AI" vs. "AI+" paradigms (84% SaaS integrate AI); (5.2) Emergence drivers (acceleration post-2023 via LLMs); (5.3) Capability gradients (text/data focus > autonomy); (5.4) Scene penetration ("open source/save flow" to process reengineering); (5.5) Ecosystem competition (domestic models like DeepSeek 29%, API calls 70.7%). Integrate from MERICS (China's chip progress) and Artificial Analysis (model performance gaps).

#### 5.1 "+AI" vs. "AI+" Paradigms

The dichotomy between "+AI" and "AI+" paradigms encapsulates the dual pathways of AI integration in enterprise products, with the former emphasizing incremental optimization and the latter systemic reconfiguration [7]. In the "+AI" model, AI augments existing software ecosystems—such as CRM, OA, ERP, and BI platforms—through modular additions like intelligent chatbots, automated reporting, content generation assistants, or predictive analytics, characterized by low risk, rapid deployment, and high reusability [7]. Survey data indicate that 49.5% of enterprises adopt this approach by embedding AI into legacy products to enhance competitiveness and customer retention, while 26.8% develop standalone AI offerings to explore new growth avenues [7]. A further 7.7% provide customized AI solutions for complex scenarios, and 16% of SaaS firms remain without AI capabilities, though 13.4% have planned integrations [7].

Conversely, "AI+" paradigms reconstruct product logic around AI cores, featuring high R&D investment, algorithmic dependency, and deep ecosystem binding, manifesting in forms like intelligent search engines, AI collaboration platforms, data insight systems, and AI Agents [7]. This model enables flexible monetization via API calls, outcome-based fees, or platform sharing, but demands greater innovation to overcome architectural constraints [7]. Overall, 84% of SaaS enterprises offer AI functionalities, yet the prevalence of "+AI" (49.5%) over pure "AI+" suggests a transitional phase where homogenization risks loom, as noted in CEIBS [5], which estimates 75% market share for SaaS-driven AI amid commoditization pressures.

Table 5 summarizes the distribution of AI integration modes among SaaS enterprises:

Integration Mode	Percentage (%)
Embed AI in Existing Products	49.5
Standalone AI Products	26.8
Customized AI Solutions	7.7
Planned but Not Implemented	13.4
No AI Capabilities or Plans	2.6

This bifurcation aligns with RAND [4], where policy incentives under "Made in China 2025" favor "+AI" for quick wins in state-supported sectors, while "AI+" leverages U.S. vertical integrations but leverages China's distributed architectures for scalability [3].

#### 5.2 Emergence Drivers

The temporal surge in AI product releases underscores a shift in drivers from technological experimentation to market-driven imperatives, accelerating post-2023 due to LLM breakthroughs [7]. Prior to 2022, only 12.2% of enterprises launched AI products, primarily as pilot initiatives by tech-forward pioneers [7]. This rose to 20.3% in 2023, propelled by global LLM catalysts like ChatGPT, igniting market awareness and scenario integrations [7]. By 2024, adoption reached 27.4% with maturing toolkits enabling validated deployments, culminating in 40.1% in 2025, signaling mainstream normalization [7].

Table 6 delineates the release timeline:

Release Period	Percentage (%)
2022 and Earlier	12.2
2023	20.3
2024	27.4
2025	40.1

This trajectory reflects a pivot from supply-side innovations to demand-side pulls, such as efficiency gains and competitive pressures [7]. Stanford HAI [1] corroborates this, attributing China's 2024 LLM surge to open-source ecosystems reducing barriers, while Artificial Analysis [12] highlights post-ChatGPT performance improvements in Chinese models (e.g., DeepSeek's reasoning scores nearing GPT-4 levels), fostering enterprise confidence. NBR [6] adds that public optimism in China—twice that of the U.S.—amplifies adoption, though early phases (pre-2023) were constrained by compute limitations addressed via indigenous chips [3].

#### 5.3 Capability Gradients

AI capabilities exhibit a hierarchical gradient from foundational efficiency tools to advanced autonomy, with over half concentrating on text generation/processing (24.9%) and data-driven analysis/prediction (23.9%), forming the core for knowledge work and decision support [7]. Efficiency enhancers follow: process automation (20.8%) and multimodal interactions (17.7%), collectively 38.5%, targeting cost reductions and user-centric experiences [7]. Autonomous decision-making lags at

10.5%, indicative of caution around reliability and accountability in critical workflows [7].

Table 7 outlines capability distributions:

Capability Category	Percentage (%)
Text Generation/Processing	24.9
Data Analysis/Prediction	23.9
Process Automation/Execution	20.8
Multimodal Interactions	17.7
Autonomous Decision-Making	10.5
Others	2.2

This spectrum prioritizes "execution augmentation" over "thought augmentation," evolving toward deeper reasoning layers [7]. MERICS [3] links this to hardware advancements enabling scalable text/data tasks, while gaps in autonomy echo Artificial Analysis [12], where Chinese LLMs trail in complex inference, necessitating hybrid human-AI governance as per WEF [2].

#### 5.4 Scene Penetration

AI infiltration spans from "revenue expansion and cost reduction" ("开源节流") to comprehensive process reengineering, with data analysis (26.5%), customer service (20.9%), and marketing/growth (20.7%) dominating at 68.1% aggregate, addressing core enterprise needs for insights, personalization, and acquisition [7]. Process automation (19.0%) signifies backend permeation, liberating human resources for high-value tasks [7].

Table 8 enumerates scene penetrations:

Application Scene	Percentage (%)
Data Analysis	26.5
Customer Service	20.9
Marketing and Growth	20.7
Process Automation	19.0
Others	12.9

This progression from frontend efficiencies to systemic transformations aligns with SCSP [8], projecting AI's 26% GDP contribution by 2030 via industrial reengineering, though USCC [10] cautions on uneven penetration in non-digital sectors.

#### 5.5 Ecosystem Competition

Competitive dynamics pivot toward domestic model dominance and platform integration, with Baidu Wenxin (29.0%), Alibaba Tongyi (22.4%), and DeepSeek (13.4%) comprising 64.8%, outpacing OpenAI's ChatGPT (7.7%), driven by data sovereignty and localization advantages [7]. API invocations prevail at 70.7%, versus open-source integration (19.0%) or self-training (10.3%), lowering barriers but highlighting dependency risks [7].

Table 9 details model preferences:

Model Provider	Percentage (%)
Baidu Wenxin	29.0
Alibaba Tongyi	22.4
DeepSeek	13.4

Model Provider	Percentage (%)
OpenAI (ChatGPT)	7.7
Others	27.5

This indigenization resonates with MERICS [3], crediting chip self-reliance for ecosystem resilience, while Digital Science [11] notes China's collaborative edges accelerating integrations. Future contests, per [7], will emphasize platform ecosystems over isolated models, echoing RAND [4]'s full-stack bolstering.

#### Section 6: Commercialization Paths

This section detail value-to-revenue conversion from Chapter 4. Subsections: (6.1) Maturity stages (55.9% validation, 31.4% expansion); (6.2) Pricing models (SaaS bundling 35.3%, AI-native effect-based 21.2%); (6.3) Pricing transparency (64.4% negotiation-based); (6.4) Decision structures (CEO-led 43.5%, triangular collaboration); (6.5) Influencing factors (customer willingness 36.9%); (6.6) Unit prices (60% <10k RMB, high-end barriers); (6.7) Revenue scales (56% <5M RMB). Cross-reference WEF on pricing in industry transformation.

##### 6.1 Maturity Stages

Enterprise AI commercialization exhibits a pyramid-like maturity distribution, with over half (55.9%) in the "product validation" phase, focusing on market fit and iterative refinement [7]. Approximately 31.4% have advanced to "scale-up expansion," serving as the industry's growth engine through broader deployment and customer acquisition [7]. Only 8.5% reach "growth optimization," optimizing ROI and operations, while a mere 2.7% attain "mature stability," characterized by predictable revenue streams and ecosystem integration [7]. This stratification underscores a transitional industry, where technical feasibility outpaces commercial viability, with most firms grappling with ROI uncertainties and pilot-to-scale hurdles [7].

Table 10 summarizes the maturity stages:

Maturity Stage	Percentage (%)
Product Validation	55.9
Scale-Up Expansion	31.4
Growth Optimization	8.5
Mature Stability	2.7

WEF [2] aligns this with China's AI transformation phases, noting that policy targets (e.g., widespread fusion by 2027) accelerate expansion but leave maturity gaps in SMEs. RAND [4] attributes delays to policy emphasis on innovation over commercialization, suggesting subsidies could expedite progression for state-affiliated firms.

##### 6.2 Pricing Models

Pricing models diverge markedly by enterprise type, with SaaS vendors favoring integration into existing ecosystems and AI-native firms emphasizing performance-linked flexibility [7]. For SaaS (81.6% of samples), "bundling as new features into original products" dominates at 35.3%, leveraging upgrades to boost average revenue per

user (ARPU) without disrupting client bases [7]. Independent module subscriptions follow at 20.1%, offering add-on value, while effect-based pricing is minimal (4.3%) due to risk aversion [7].

AI-native firms (15.4%) adopt more innovative approaches: pay-per-use (24.2%) and hybrid pricing (19.7%) tie costs to consumption, facilitating scalability, while effect-based (21.2%) signals confidence in outcomes, fostering deep client alignment [7]. This contrasts with SaaS's defensive strategies, highlighting AI-natives' disruptive intent [7].

Table 11 details pricing models by type:

Pricing Model	SaaS (%)	AI-Native (%)
Bundle into Original Products	35.3	-
Independent Module Subscription	20.1	-
Pay-Per-Use	-	24.2
Hybrid Pricing	-	19.7
Effect-Based	4.3	21.2
Other	<10	<10

CEIBS [5] corroborates this bifurcation, linking SaaS bundling to 75% market share stability, while WEF [2] advocates effect-based models for industry transformation, predicting their rise to align with value creation.

### 6.3 Pricing Transparency

Transparency remains low, with 64.4% of firms relying on "backroom negotiations" via sales channels, reflecting AI's customized nature and non-standard valuation [7]. Partial website disclosure accounts for 19.7%, often for base tiers, while full public pricing is rare (3.19% other) [7]. This opacity stems from dynamic factors like usage scales and service levels, complicating fixed listings [7].

Table 12 outlines transparency levels:

Transparency Level	Percentage (%)
Negotiation-Only	64.4
Partial Website Disclosure	19.7
Full Public Pricing	<10
Other	3.19

Stanford HAI [1] notes similar trends globally, with China's opacity exacerbated by rapid iteration, though MERICS [3] suggests indigenous ecosystems may foster standardization as models mature.

### 6.4 Decision Structures

Pricing decisions blend top-down authority with collaborative input, with CEO/high executives leading at 43.5% penetration, underscoring strategic importance [7]. Product teams (22.6%) and sales (20.3%) provide core execution insights, while marketing/operations (9.7%), finance (8.5%), and externals (<5%) are marginalized [7]. Combination-wise, CEO-alone dominates (34.2%),

followed by CEO-product-sales "triangular" synergy (14.51%), and subsets like CEO-product (7.3%) [7].

Table 13 enumerates decision participation:

Decision Participant	Penetration (%)
CEO/High Executives	43.5
Product Team	22.6
Sales Team	20.3
Marketing/Operations	9.7
Finance	8.5
External Consultants	<5

NBR [6] links this to China's adoption optimism, favoring agile CEO decisions in early stages, while SCSP [8] contrasts with U.S. models, where finance plays a larger role in mature markets.

### 6.5 Influencing Factors

Market-driven elements predominate, with customer willingness (36.9%) as the primary anchor, prioritizing perceived value over costs [7]. Costs follow (26.9%), forming a baseline, while competitors' pricing (23.0%) and product uniqueness (12.0%) shape positioning [7]. Other factors (1.2%) are negligible [7].

Table 14 lists influencing factors:

Influencing Factor	Percentage (%)
Customer Willingness	36.9
Costs	26.9
Competitors' Pricing	23.0
Product Uniqueness	12.0
Other	1.2

WEF [2] emphasizes value-orientation for transformation, while USCC [10] notes policy influences on costs via subsidies, potentially distorting market signals.

### 6.6 Unit Price Distribution

Unit prices form a dual structure: 59.6% below 10,000 RMB for lightweight, standardized offerings promoting accessibility, and 34.9% in 10,100-1,000,000 RMB for mid-tier solutions [7]. High-end (>1,000,000 RMB) at 5.7% erects barriers via customization [7].

Table 15 details distributions:

Unit Price (RMB)	Percentage (%)
<10,000	24.1
10,000-100,000	35.5
100,100-250,000	11.4
250,100-500,000	11.4
500,100-1,000,000	12.1
>1,000,000	5.7

Digital Science [11] highlights this as evidence of broadening access, akin to research dominance translating to market tiers.

### 6.7 Revenue Scales

Among firms with AI products, 75% generate revenue, but scales are modest: 56% below 5 million RMB annually, indicating survival struggles [7]. Mid-scales (5-100 million

RMB) comprise ~24%, with high-end (>100 million RMB) ~20%, signaling emerging leaders [7].

Table 16 enumerates revenue scales (among revenue-generating firms):

Annual Revenue (RMB)	Percentage (%)
<5,000,000	56
5,000,000-10,000,000	10.1
10,000,000-50,000,000	10.1
50,000,000-100,000,000	3.7
100,000,000-500,000,000	7.4
500,000,000-1,000,000,000	3.7
>1,000,000,000	9.0

Liu et al. [9] parallels this with AI's urban green impacts, suggesting revenue growth ties to sector-specific scaling.

## Section 7: Challenges and Pain Points

This section synthesizes barriers from Chapter 5. Subsections: (7.1) Low old-client penetration (54.5% <10%); (7.2) Shared ceilings (fragmented demands 29.7-30%); (7.3) Divergent dilemmas (AI-native: value recognition 21.7%; SaaS: differentiation 12.7%). Compare with Stanford HAI on talent shortages and RAND on policy risks.

### 7.1 Low Old-Client Penetration

Despite broad AI deployment, penetration rates among pre-existing clients remain suboptimal, with 54.5% of enterprises achieving less than 10% adoption in legacy portfolios, and only 4.8% exceeding 50% [7]. This inertia stems from entrenched workflows, risk aversion to unproven ROI, and integration complexities with legacy systems, as AI solutions often demand data restructuring or process overhauls without immediate tangible benefits [7]. For instance, survey respondents cite client-side organizational silos and insufficient data maturity as primary deterrents, perpetuating a "pilot trap" where initial trials fail to scale [7].

Table 17 delineates penetration distributions:

This low uptake echoes Stanford HAI [1], where global enterprise AI adoption hovers at 55% but deep

Penetration Rate	Percentage (%)
<10%	54.5
10-20%	21.8
21-30%	9.7
31-40%	4.8
41-50%	4.2
>50%	4.8

integration lags at 20-30% due to skills gaps, with China's emphasis on rapid prototyping amplifying the issue. WEF [2] further contextualizes this within industry transformation, noting that Chinese firms' focus on greenfield applications overlooks brownfield retrofits, risking value leakage in established markets.

### 7.2 Shared Ceilings

A universal constraint across enterprise types is the "ceiling" of fragmented, non-scalable demands, cited by 29.7-30% of respondents as the foremost barrier to expansion [7]. This manifests in bespoke requirements that resist standardization, leading to high customization costs and inefficient resource allocation, with AI projects often confined to isolated use cases rather than platform-level reuse [7]. Additional pain points include quantifiable value challenges (e.g., ROI metrics ambiguity at 25.3%), subdued payment willingness (22.4%), and talent shortages (18.9%), collectively forming a "demand-side trilemma" where technical feasibility does not equate to commercial viability [7].

Table 18 enumerates top shared challenges:

Challenge Category	Percentage (%)
Fragmented/Non-Scalable Demands	29.7-30.0
Value Quantification Difficulties	25.3
Low Payment Willingness	22.4
Talent Shortages	18.9
Others (e.g., Data Compliance)	<10

RAND [4] attributes such ceilings to policy-induced distortions, where subsidies prioritize innovation volume over market alignment, mirroring U.S. experiences but amplified by China's compressed development timeline. SCSP [8] quantifies this through gap analyses, projecting that unresolved fragmentation could cap China's AI GDP contribution at 15-20% below potential by 2030 without ecosystem interventions.

### 7.3 Divergent Dilemmas

Strategic foci diverge sharply between AI-native and SaaS enterprises, engendering type-specific predicaments that hinder tailored commercialization [7]. This bifurcation underscores a maturity mismatch: AI-natives grapple with market validation, while SaaS incumbents face innovation inertia [7].

#### 7.3.1 AI-Native Enterprises: Market Troubles for Tech Pioneers

AI-native firms, comprising 15.4% of samples, prioritize technological edge but encounter market headwinds, with 21.7% citing value recognition deficits as their apex challenge [7]. This "tech-first trap" arises from overemphasis on algorithmic sophistication without commensurate client education, resulting in mismatched expectations and protracted sales cycles [7]. Secondary issues include scalability (19.3%) and talent acquisition (16.9%), as rapid iteration demands specialized skills amid competitive poaching [7].

Table 19 highlights AI-native challenges:

Challenge Category	Percentage (%)
Value Recognition Deficits	21.7
Scalability Constraints	19.3
Talent Shortages	16.9
Payment Willingness	14.5

Challenge Category	Percentage (%)
Others	<10

MERICS [3] parallels this with self-reliance narratives, where indigenous model pursuits (e.g., DeepSeek) excel technically but falter in market storytelling, contrasting U.S. AI-natives' venture-backed go-to-market strategies [1].

### 7.3.2 SaaS Enterprises: Innovation Troubles for Market Veterans

SaaS vendors, dominant at 81.6%, leverage established ecosystems but struggle with differentiation, with 12.7% identifying competitive homogenization as their primary dilemma [7]. This "market-veteran bind" involves commoditized AI add-ons eroding margins, compounded by integration frictions (10.2%) and client inertia (9.8%), as legacy platforms resist disruptive "AI+" shifts [7].

Table 20 outlines SaaS challenges:

Challenge Category	Percentage (%)
Competitive Homogenization	12.7
Integration Frictions	10.2
Client Inertia	9.8
ROI Quantification	8.5
Others	<10

CEIBS [5] corroborates this, estimating SaaS AI margins at 15-20% below non-AI baselines due to feature parity, while Artificial Analysis [12] attributes it to LLM commoditization, urging vertical specialization to escape the trap.

In aggregate, these challenges delineate a commercialization inflection point, where demand maturation and organizational agility emerge as pivotal levers, as per [7]. Addressing them necessitates hybrid strategies blending policy support [4] with talent ecosystems [1], to transition from fragmented pilots to scalable value engines.

### Section 8: Future Trends

This section forecasts based on Chapter 6. Subsections: (8.1) Iteration acceleration (57% more frequent); (8.2) Pricing adjustments (37.8% structural); (8.3) Market strategies (vertical focus 37.6%); (8.4) R&D investments (84% >10% growth); (8.5) Risk alerts (tech iteration 36.8%); (8.6) Potential predictions (efficiency tools > verticals > multimodals). Align with State of AI 2025 and SCSP Gaps Analysis for global parallels.

#### 8.1 Iteration Trends

Enterprise AI product iterations are transitioning from a prevailing "flexible exploration" modality—characterized by demand-responsive, non-cyclical updates (32.9%)—toward a "comprehensive acceleration" ethos, as evinced by prospective plans [7]. Historically, iterations manifest a hybrid profile: 20.3% weekly, 10.5% monthly, and 9.8% quarterly, with high-frequency modes underscoring agile imperatives amid technological flux [7]. Prospectively, 57.0% of firms envisage amplified frequencies, 30.3% maintenance of extant rhythms, aggregating to 87.3% sustaining or augmenting velocity, thereby mitigating

obsolescence in a domain where LLM breakthroughs post-2023 have compressed development cycles [7].

Table 21 encapsulates iteration anticipations:

Anticipated Iteration Adjustment	Percentage (%)
More Frequent	57.0
Maintain Current	30.3
Less Frequent	1.4
Undecided	11.3

This acceleration mirrors Stanford HAI [1], wherein China's 2024 LLM releases (15 models) necessitate perpetual refinement to sustain parity, contrasting U.S. capital-fueled sprints. SCSP [8] posits such dynamism as a counterpoise to compute deficits, albeit exacerbating resource strains in SMEs.

#### 8.2 Pricing Adjustment Trends

Pricing paradigms evince a circumspect, diversified reconfiguration, with 37.8% of enterprises electing structural modulations—selective increments for differentiated offerings juxtaposed with decrements for commoditized APIs [7]. Observational reticence pervades 28.7%, deferring adjustments pending market vicissitudes, while stasis (14.9%) and escalations (13.3%) predominate over devaluations (5.3%), reflecting valuation anchored in perceived utility amid cost volatilities [7]. This mosaic heralds a maturation from cost-centric to value-centric logics, wherein premium models command surcharges and standardized interfaces face deflationary pressures [7].

Table 22 delineates pricing prognoses:

Pricing Strategy	Percentage (%)
Structural Adjustment	37.8
Undecided	28.7
Maintain Current	14.9
Primarily Increase	13.3
Primarily Decrease	5.3

CEIBS [5] aligns this with a 19.1% CAGR trajectory, advocating effect-based modalities to navigate commoditization, while WEF [2] envisages policy-catalyzed standardization ameliorating opacity.

#### 8.3 Market Strategy Trends

Strategic emphases gravitate toward vertical profundity (37.6%), eschewing horizontal ubiquity for domain-specific entrenchment in finance, healthcare, and manufacturing, where bespoke know-how erects barriers [7]. Ecosystem amplification (26.9%) and internationalization (14.0%) constitute ancillary vectors, fostering alliances for resource complementarity and global outreach, respectively [7]. Branding IP-ization (10.7%) and intelligent marketing (10.4%) emerge as nascent levers, leveraging AI for promotional efficacy [7].

Table 23 enumerates strategic priorities:

Market Strategy	Percentage (%)
Vertical Domain Focus	37.6
Ecosystem Expansion	26.9

Market Strategy	Percentage (%)
Internationalization	14.0
Brand IP-ization	10.7
Intelligent Marketing	10.4
Others	0.4

RAND [4] contextualizes this vertical pivot as a policy-orchestrated riposte to export constraints, paralleling MERICS [3]'s indigenous stack fortification for sectoral sovereignty.

#### 8.4 R&D Investment Trends

R&D infusions are slated for substantial amplification, with 84.0% of entities forecasting increments surpassing 10%: 54.8% in the 11-50% bracket, 20.5% at 51-100%, and 9.6% exceeding 101% [7]. This underscores a consensus on innovation as a sine qua non for competitiveness, particularly amid talent scarcities and iteration imperatives [7].

Table 24 outlines investment escalations:

R&D Growth Rate	Percentage (%)
11-50%	54.8
51-100%	20.5
101-200%	5.4
>200%	4.2
0-10%	10.0
Decrease	1.4
Undecided	3.7

State of AI 2025 [13] corroborates this fervor, projecting China's R&D outlays to eclipse \$20 billion by 2026, fueling multimodal advancements.

#### 8.5 Risk Alerts

Predominant anxieties coalesce around technological hyper-iteration (36.8%), engendering depreciation perils for extant investments [7]. Talent deficits (21.3%) and client attrition (17.1%) ensue, followed by liquidity ruptures (10.7%) and regulatory conformance (10.5%), delineating a multifaceted risk panorama [7].

Table 25 itemizes risk hierarchies:

Risk Category	Percentage (%)
Technological Iteration	36.8
Talent Shortages	21.3
Low Client Retention	17.1
Cash Flow Disruption	10.7
Policy Compliance	10.5
Others	3.6

NBR [6] echoes iteration anxieties, attributing them to perceptual asymmetries, while USCC [10] accentuates policy volatilities under MIC2025.

#### 8.6 Potential Predictions

Emergent potentials stratify into tripartite echelons: efficiency instruments (21.3%) as vanguard, encompassing automation and analytics; vertical implementations (17.1%) as intermediary, tailoring to sectoral exigencies; and

multimodal engagements (12.8%) as tertiary, amalgamating text, imagery, and voice for immersive interfaces [7]. Ancillary domains include autonomous agents (10.7%) and data governance (10.5%), prognosticating a multifaceted maturation [7].

Table 26 stratifies potentials:

Potential Echelon	Category Example	Percentage (%)
First (Efficiency Tools)	Process Automation, Data Insights	21.3
Second (Vertical Applications)	Industry-Specific Solutions	17.1
Third (Multimodal Interactions)	Multi-Modal Interfaces	12.8
Others	Agents, Governance	~38

Artificial Analysis [12] and Digital Science [11] affirm multimodal ascendancy, with China's research dominance expediting transitions.

#### Section 9: Strategic Recommendations

This section provide actionable guidelines from Chapter 7. Subsections: (9.1) For enterprises (value-first, capability reuse); (9.2) For investors (focus on deep-verticals); (9.3) For policymakers (data standards, trust systems). Draw implications from all sources for holistic advice.

##### 9.1 For Enterprises

Enterprises must reconceptualize AI not as ephemeral projects but as perdurable assets engendering recurrent value, a paradigm shift imperative for transcending the "pilot trap" evinced in 55.9% of firms ensconced in validation phases [7]. This entails a quadripartite stratagem:

First, valorize primacy. Chief executives prioritize return-on-investment (ROI) over technological novelty; ergo, institute quantifiable, traceable, and retrospective valuation schemas. Deploy ROI models to delineate expenditures and yields, productivity metrics to gauge AI's augmentation of roles and workflows, and intelligent asset ledgers to accrete models, data, and capabilities as corporate patrimony. Periodic audits calibrate strategies amid rapid iterations, averting profligacy [7]. This resonates with WEF [2], which posits value quantification as foundational for AI-infused industrial reconfiguration, ensuring alignments with business imperatives.

Second, consolidate capabilities. Dispersed development begets redundancies and inefficiencies; thus, erect a unified AI substratum encompassing platformized model governance and data stewardship, modular aptitude repositories, and standardized interfaces with automation toolchains. Such architectures not only amplify departmental efficacy but also underpin scalable proliferation [7]. Stanford HAI [1] corroborates this via global exemplars, where mid-tier enterprises (10-100

million RMB revenue) leveraging centralized platforms evince 20-30% superior commercialization velocities.

Third, organizational congruence. Commercialization impasses oft stem from procedural misalignments rather than technical deficits; hence, foster explicit governance protocols, interdisciplinary role synergies (e.g., Chief AI Officers, AI Product Managers, solution architects), and workforce upskilling in AI utilization. Fluid mechanisms expedite deployment [7]. NBR [6] augments this by highlighting perceptual asymmetries in adoption, advocating training to bridge cognition-organizational chasms, thereby elevating maturity from exploration to optimization.

Fourth, ecosystem orchestration. Enterprises need not monopolize all proficiencies but must delineate their niche within value chains, forging resilient alliances with foundational model purveyors (e.g., Baidu Wenxin), sectoral solution artisans, system integrators, and domain savants. This collaborative edifice amplifies resource access and risk mitigation [7]. MERICS [3] underscores this in self-reliance contexts, where ecosystemic interdependencies via indigenous stacks (e.g., Huawei Ascend) fortify against exogenous disruptions, paralleling U.S. vertical integrations but with augmented policy scaffolding [4].

Collectively, these imperatives transmute AI from cost loci to value epicenters, with [7] estimating that adherents evince 2-3x superior ROI vis-à-vis laggards.

## 9.2 For Investors

Investment entities should anchor allocations in structural certitudes, eschewing ephemeral effervescence for trajectories evincing maturation and scalability, as 56% of AI revenues subsist below 5 million RMB [7]. This mandates multifaceted scrutiny: appraise subdomain technological ripeness, market consolidation, revenue magnitudes and trajectories to unearth high-potential niches. Prioritize ventures manifesting elevated commercialization quotients, stratified unit prices (e.g., >100,000 RMB for bespoke solutions), and resilient monetization archetypes to circumvent valuation disarray and modal immaturity [7].

Vertical profundity emerges as a lodestar, with manufacturing quality inspection and financial risk governance proffering deterministic yields owing to quantifiable value and circumscribed data loops [7]. CEIBS [5] bolsters this via landscape prognostications, forecasting 19.1% CAGR in deep-sectoral AI, where "industry know-how + data closure" erects moats. Investors ought to calibrate risks through due diligence on organizational preparedness—e.g., MLOps proficiency and cross-functional synergies—as these outstrip model prowess in prognosticating success [7]. SCSP [8] furnishes comparative caveats, admonishing against overexposure to compute-intensive domains amid U.S.-China asymmetries, advocating diversified portfolios encompassing open-source ecosystems for resilience.

Furthermore, temporal horizons warrant calibration: short-term emphases on efficiency utilities (e.g., automation tools at 21.3% potential [7]), mid-term on vertical appliques

(17.1%), and long-term on multimodal interfaces (12.8%), aligning with State of AI 2025 [13] trajectories. This stratified approach mitigates capital misallocations, potentiating 15-20% superior returns in certitude-laden segments [5].

## 9.3 For Policymakers

Policymakers must architect foundational infrastructures buttressing AI commercialization, rectifying structural asymmetries unearthed in enterprise appeals, regional disequilibria (70% resource concentration in five poles), data conformance predicaments, and communal technological bottlenecks [7]. This encompasses perfecting computational substrata (e.g., "East Data West Computing"), promulgating intersectoral data interoperability norms to facilitate secure sharing, and promulgating regulatory equilibria harmonizing innovation incentives with risk prophylaxis [7].

Targeted interventions should ameliorate agglomeration effects via decentralized incentives for peripheral locales, alleviating talent scarcities (21.3% risk [7]) through vocational programs, and bolstering SME metamorphosis via subsidies and incubators, as 83% of firms are sub-500-employee entities [7]. RAND [4] amplifies this with "Made in China 2025" evaluations, advocating policy refinements to pivot from research volumetrics to commercialization efficacy, mitigating export constraints through indigenous chip and framework ecosystems [3].

Moreover, foster trust architectures encompassing ethical guidelines, privacy safeguards, and certification schemas to surmount demand-side reticence (e.g., payment unwillingness at 22.4% [7]). WEF [2] complements this by envisioning policy as a catalyst for "AI+" fusion by 2027, integrating green compute mandates with entity permeation. Longitudinal monitoring, per Digital Science [11], ensures adaptive governance amid research dominance translating to industrial yields.

These directives coalesce into a sustainable ecosystem, potentiating AI's 26% GDP impetus by 2030 [8], with [7] positing that infrastructural investments could expedite maturity for 30-40% of validation-phase entities.

## Section 10: Conclusion

In this survey, we have systematically dissected the state of enterprise-level AI commercialization in China, leveraging granular empirical data from the 2025 China Enterprise-Level AI Commercialization Progress Report [7]—encompassing a mixed-methods analysis of 229 firms—while integrating comparative insights from global and domestic benchmarks [1-13]. The analysis unveils an ecosystem in flux, characterized by SaaS dominance (81.6%), regional agglomeration in five innovation poles (capturing 70% of resources), and a maturation trajectory from "+AI" augmentations to "AI+" reconstructions, albeit constrained by demand-side bottlenecks such as fragmented scenarios (29.7-30%) and low legacy-client penetration (54.5% <10%). Commercialization paths evince stratification, with validation phases prevailing (55.9%) and

value-based pricing emerging amid modest revenues (56% <5 million RMB), while future trends portend accelerated iterations (57%), vertical emphases (37.6%), and R&D surges (84% >10% growth), tempered by iteration anxieties (36.8%). These findings, contextualized against U.S.-China asymmetries [1,4,8], underscore China's pivot toward self-reliant stacks [3] and application-centric growth, projecting AI's 26% GDP contribution by 2030 [8].

The contributions of this work are manifold and address lacunae in extant literature. Foremost, it furnishes a synthesized maturity framework, bridging ecosystem overviews (e.g., spindle-shaped penetration [7]) with evolutionary paradigms (e.g., capability gradients from text/data foci at 48.8% to autonomy at 10.5% [7]), commercialization metrics (e.g., dual pricing structures [7]), and stakeholder imperatives, thereby transcending macro-level overviews [1,2,5] and policy critiques [4,10]. Second, the eight core insights—spanning scale exploration, demand-supply mismatches, and ecosystemic shifts—distill actionable intelligence, such as organizational readiness supplanting model prowess as a threshold [7], informing enterprises' assetization strategies and investors' vertical targeting [5,7]. Third, by proposing infrastructural enhancements for policymakers (e.g., data interoperability norms [7]), it advances equitable AI diffusion, mitigating urban biases [3,9] and fostering sustainable ecosystems. These augment prior surveys [6,11-13] by emphasizing enterprise granularity, yielding a blueprint for navigating AI's transformative epoch.

Notwithstanding these advancements, avenues for future inquiry abound. Longitudinal studies, tracking cohorts beyond the 2025 snapshot [7], could elucidate temporal dynamics, such as iteration impacts on ROI amid projected R&D escalations [13]. Cross-cultural comparisons, juxtaposing China's distributed architectures [3] with U.S. capital-intensive models [1], might illuminate hybrid paradigms for global AI governance, addressing ethical quandaries like data sovereignty [2,6]. Sectoral deep-dives, extending [9]'s urban green focus to underrepresented domains (e.g., agriculture via multimodal tools [12,13]), could refine potential hierarchies [7]. Methodologically, augmenting [7]'s sample with non-SaaS and peripheral entities would mitigate biases, while integrating real-time APIs for dynamic metrics could enhance predictive fidelity.

Broader implications reverberate across global AI governance. China's commercialization odyssey—fueled by policy resonance [4,10] and indigenous innovation [3,11]—exemplifies a paradigm where ecological synergy supplants algorithmic primacy [7,13], offering lessons for emerging economies in balancing self-reliance with collaboration [8]. Yet, unresolved challenges like talent shortages [1,6] and regulatory flux [2,4] necessitate multilateral frameworks to avert fragmentation, ensuring AI's equitable harness for societal advancement. As enterprise AI evolves from conceptual to commercial bedrock, this survey advocates vigilant stewardship to realize its profound potential.

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