The Incorporation of Cryptocurrencies into International Balance of Payments Statistics and the Challenges to Monetary Policy Independence in Major Economies: A Comparative Analysis Based on the IMF (BPM7/2025 SNA) Framework – The Paths of the Federal Res

Abstract

This paper elevates the question of "whether and how encrypt assets enter the Balance of Payments (BOP) and International Investment Position (IIP)" from an accounting technical issue to a practical implication for the monetary policy independence (MPI) of major economies. The central thesis is that when a category of cross-border "quasi-currency/quasi-asset" can be held by both residents and non-residents yet remains largely invisible within traditional correspondent banking systems, it not only distorts capital account signals and affects foreign exchange/reserve management logic, but also partially "externalizes" private credit creation and redemption risks onto central bank balance sheets and liquidity management boundaries through the coupling of stablecoins and short-term government financing markets. The paper first examines the IMF's latest statistical framework (BPM7/2025 SNA framework, with GN F.18 classification gradually converging toward the treatment of "liabilities = financial assets / no corresponding liabilities = non-productive non-financial assets"), then uses published cross-border flow and stablecoin contagion evidence from the BIS and the New York Fed to demonstrate that even if "Bitcoin-like assets" do not become reserve assets, they can still undermine the stability of the MPI transmission mechanism— "interest rate–exchange rate–capital flows" —by altering net errors and omissions (NEOs) in capital accounts, shadow exchange demands, and regulatory arbitrage channels. The approach to adopting "stablecoin-like instruments" (liability-bearing financial instruments) directly determines whether monetary sovereignty is replaced by private dollar or offshore fiat currencies. The analysis then compares the Federal Reserve (with its market infrastructure development, banking supervision mechanisms, and the trend toward using stablecoins as payment instruments) with the European Central Bank (through its defensive unified MiCA legislation, euro anchoring, and measures to curb currency substitution), proposing a three-dimensional response framework encompassing statistics, regulation, and liquidity safety nets. It further provides asymmetric policy implications for emerging markets versus reserve currency issuers.